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Abstract—: Performing smart computations in a 
context of cloud computing and big data is highly 
appreciated today. Fully homomorphic encryption 
(FHE) is a smart category of encryption schemes that 
allows working with the data in its encrypted form. It 
permits us to preserve confidentiality of our sensible 
data and to benefit from cloud computing powers. 
Currently, it has been demonstrated by many existing 
schemes that the theory is feasible but the efficiency 
needs to be dramatically improved in order to make it 
usable for real applications. One subtle difficulty is 
how to efficiently handle the noise. This paper aims to 
introduce an efficient and verifiable FHE based on a 
new mathematic structure that is noise free. 
Keywords: verifiable, fully homomorphic encryption, 
Lipschitz integers, scheme, cloud, security, smart 
computations. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing has manifested as a powerful 
computing model in the last decade, with numerous 
advantages both to clients and providers. One of the 
obvious huge advantage is that clients can delegate 
their complex computations and benefit from the 
best technologies and computation powers at low 
costs. The cost benefits presented by cloud 
technologies is one of the major arguments that 
justify the spreading of cloud computing in many 
industries. During the last few years, enterprises 
culture of accepting cloud computing was 
developed and many companies had shown their 
ready to adhere cloud and benefit from its 
capacities, but businesses are now finding that there 
is a number of security issues that have to be treated 
when venturing into the cloud. 
Privacy of sensible data is one of most important 
security issues. Leakage of some data can cause 
huge damages to its owners. In general, to save 
privacy of our data it is advised to encrypt it before 
storing it on a remote cloud server. Using classical 
encryption schemes as RSA, AES, 3DES… allows 
clients to preserve data privacy during transmission 
to the cloud, but if a client requests the cloud to 
perform a complex treatment on its data, he should 
share his private key with the remote cloud server. 
This traditional use of cryptography may not be the 
best solution in terms of privacy, especially if we 
consider the cloud as an untrusted part. 
One solution to this problematic is doing smart 
computations on encrypted data, this idea was early 
introduced by Rivest, Adleman and Dertozous in 
1978[1], authors conjectured the existence of a 
privacy homomorphism. Today we are using the 
notion of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) 
rather than privacy homomorphism. 
 
Figure 1: Fully Homomorphic Encryption diagram 
FHE schemes (figure 1) are considered as the next 
generation algorithms for cryptography, it is a type 
of smart encryption cryptosystems that support 
arbitrary computations on ciphertexts without ever 
needing to decrypt or reveal it. In a context of cloud 
computing and distributed computation this is a 
highly precious power. In fact, a significant 
application of fully homomorphic encryption is to 
big data and cloud computing. Generally, FHE is 
used in outsourcing complex computations on 
sensitive data stored in a cloud as it can be 
employed in specific applications for big data like 
secure search on encrypted big data and private 
 
 
information retrieval. It was an open problem until 
the revolutionary work of Gentry in 2009 [2]. In his 
thesis, Gentry proposed the first adequate fully 
homomorphic encryption scheme by exploiting 
properties of ideal lattices. 
Gentry’s construction is based on his bootstrapping 
theorem which provides that given a somewhat 
homomorphic encryption scheme (SWHE) that can 
evaluate homomorphically its own decryption 
circuit and an additional NAND gate, we can pass 
to a “levelled” fully homomorphic encryption 
scheme and so obtain a FHE scheme by assuming 
circular security. The purpose of using 
bootstrapping technique is to allow refreshment of 
ciphertexts and reduce noise after its growth. 
Gentry’s construction is not a single algorithm but 
it considered as a framework that inspires 
cryptologists to build new fully homomorphic 
encryption schemes [3, 4, 5, 6…]. A FHE 
cryptosystem that uses Gentry’s bootstrapping 
technique can be classified in the category of noise-
based fully homomorphic encryption schemes [7]. 
If this class of cryptosystems has the advantage to 
be robust and more secure, it has the drawback to 
be not efficient in terms of runtime and ciphertext 
size. In several works followed Gentry’s one, many 
techniques of noise management are invented to 
improve runtime efficiency and to minimise 
ciphertext and key size’s [8,9,10...], but the 
problematic of designing a practical and efficient 
fully homomorphic encryption scheme remains the 
same until now. 
In the literature we can locate a second category 
called free-noise fully homomorphic encryption 
schemes which do not need a technique of noise 
management to refresh ciphertexts. In a free-noise 
fully homomorphic encryption scheme one can do 
infinity of operations on the same ciphertext 
without noise growing. This class of encryption 
schemes is known as faster than the previous one, 
involves simple operations to evaluate circuits on 
ciphertexts and do not require a noise management 
technique, but it suffers from security problems 
because the majority of designed schemes are 
cryptanalyzed today. 
A verifiable encryption scheme is a cryptosystem 
that allows us to prove some properties about an 
encrypted value without disclosing it. If the 
verification option is combined with homomorphic 
capacities in the same encryption scheme, it 
becomes a verifiable fully homomorphic encryption 
scheme (VFHE). Consequently, a VFHE scheme 
(figure 2) is a very smart scheme that we can use to 
outsource complex computations on sensible data to 
a remote cloud server. It allows the client to verify 
the correctness of its delegated computations. 
In this work, we will adopt the free-noise approach 
to design an efficient verifiable fully homomorphic 
encryption scheme. We will try to overcome the 
problem of weak security through using the ring of 
quaternions. 
 
Figure 2: Verifiable Fully Homomorphic Encryption 
diagram 
II. OUR TECHNIQUES AND RESULTS 
We propose an efficient and verifiable noise-free 
fully homomorphic encryption scheme that uses the 
ring of Lipschitz’s quaternions and permits 
computations over encrypted data under a 
symmetric key; our scheme permits us to verify if 
the computation was performed in its correct form. 
We exploit properties of non-commutativity of 
Lipschitz integers to build our efficient encryption 
scheme. 
III. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Quaternionique field ℍ  
A quaternion is a number in a general sense. 
Quaternions encompass real and complex numbers 
in a number system where multiplication is no 
longer a commutative law. 
The quaternions were introduced by the Irish 
mathematician William Rowan Hamilton in 1843. 
They now find applications in mathematics, 
physics, computer science and engineering. 
Mathematically, the set of quaternions ℍ is a non-
commutative associative algebra on the field of real 
numbers ℝ generated by three elements 𝒾, 𝒿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝓀 
satisfying relations: 𝒾2 = 𝒿2 = 𝓀2 = 𝒾. 𝒿. 𝓀 = −1. 
Concretely, any quaternion 𝑞 is written uniquely in 
the form: 𝑞 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝒾 + 𝑐𝒿 + 𝑑𝓀 where 
𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑 are real numbers. 
 
 
The operations of addition and multiplication by a 
real scalar are trivially done term to term, whereas 
the multiplication between two quaternions is 
termed by respecting the non-commutativity and 
the rules proper to 𝑖, 𝒿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝓀. For example, given 
𝑞 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝒾 + 𝑐𝒿 + 𝑑𝓀 and 𝑞′ = 𝑎′ + 𝑏′𝒾 + 𝑐′𝒿 +
𝑑′𝓀 we have 𝑞𝑞′ = 𝑎0 + 𝑏0𝒾 + 𝑐0𝒿 + 𝑑0𝓀 such 
that: 𝑎0 = 𝑎𝑎
′ − (𝑏𝑏′ + 𝑐𝑐′ + 𝑑𝑑′), 𝑏0 = 𝑎𝑏
′ +
𝑎′𝑏 + 𝑐𝑑′ − 𝑐′𝑑, 𝑐0 = 𝑎𝑐
′ − 𝑏𝑑′ + 𝑐𝑎′ + 𝑑𝑏′ and 
𝑑0 = 𝑎𝑑
′ + 𝑏𝑐′ − 𝑐𝑏′ + 𝑎′𝑑. 
The quaternion  ?̅? = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝒾 − 𝑐𝒿 − 𝑑𝓀 is the 
conjugate of 𝑞. 
|𝑞| = √𝑞?̅? = √𝑎2 + 𝑏2 + 𝑐2 + 𝑑2 is the module of 
𝑞. The real part of 𝑞 is 𝑅𝑒(𝑞) =
𝑞+?̅?
2
= 𝑎 and the 
imaginary part is 𝐼𝑚(𝑞) =
𝑞−?̅?
2
= 𝑏𝒾 + 𝑐𝒿 + 𝑑𝓀. 
A quaternion 𝑞 is invertible if and only if its 
modulus is non-zero, and we have 𝑞−1 =
1
|𝑞|2
?̅?. 
B. Reduced form of quaternion: 
Quaternion can be represented in a more 
economical way, which considerably alleviates the 
calculations and highlights interesting results. 
Indeed, it is easy to see that ℍ is a ℝ-vectorial 
space of dimension 4, of which 
(1, 𝒾, 𝒿 , 𝓀) constitutes a direct orthonormal basis. 
We can thus separate the real component of the 
pure components, and we have for 𝑞 ∈ ℍ, 𝑞 =
(𝑎, 𝒖) such that 𝒖 is a vector of ℝ3. So for 𝑞 =
(𝑎, 𝒖) , 𝑞′ = (𝑎′, 𝒗)  ∈ ℍ and 𝜆 ∈ ℝ  we obtain: 
1. 𝑞 + 𝑞′ = (𝑎 + 𝑎′, 𝒖 + 𝒗) and 𝜆𝑞 = (𝜆𝑎, 𝜆𝒖) 
2. 𝑞𝑞′ = (𝑎𝑎′ − 𝒖. 𝒗, 𝑎𝒗 + 𝑎′𝒖 + 𝒖 ∧ 𝒗) Where 
∧ is the cross product of ℝ3. 
3. ?̅? = (𝑎, −𝒖) and  |𝑞|2 = 𝑎2 + 𝒖2. 
 
C. Ring of Lipschitz integers 
The set of quaternions defined as follows: 
ℍ(ℤ) = {𝑞 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝒾 + 𝑐𝒿 + 𝑑𝓀/a, b, c, d ∈ ℤ}  has 
a ring structure called the ring of Lipschitz integers, 
ℍ(ℤ) is trivially non-commutative. 
For r 𝑛 ∈ ℕ∗, the set of quaternions: 
ℍ(ℤ/𝑛ℤ) = {𝑞 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝒾 + 𝑐𝒿 + 𝑑𝓀/a, b, c, d ∈ ℤ/𝑛ℤ}   
has the structure of a non-commutative ring. 
A modular quaternion of Lipschitz q ∈ ℍ(ℤ/nℤ) is 
invertible if and only if its module and the integer 𝒏 
are coprime numbers, i.e |q|2 ∧ n = 1. 
D. Quaternionique matrices 𝕄𝟐(ℍ(ℤ/𝒏ℤ)) : 
The set of matrices 𝕄𝟐(ℍ(ℤ/𝒏ℤ)) describes the 
matrices with four inputs (two rows and two 
columns) which are quaternions of ℍ(ℤ/𝒏ℤ). This 
set has a non-commutative ring structure. 
There are two ways of multiplying the quaternion 
matrices: The Hamiltonian product, which respects 
the order of the factors, and the octonionique 
product, which does not respect it. 
The Hamiltonian product is defined as for all 
matrices with coefficients in a ring (not necessarily 
commutative). For example: 
𝑈 = (
𝑢11 𝑢12
𝑢21 𝑢22
) , 𝑉 = (
𝑣11 𝑣12
𝑣21 𝑣22
) 
⟹   𝑈𝑉 = (
𝑢11𝑣11 + 𝑢12𝑣21 𝑢11𝑣12 + 𝑢12𝑣22
𝑢21𝑣11 + 𝑢22𝑣21 𝑢21𝑣12 + 𝑢22𝑣22
) 
The octonionique product does not respect the order 
of the factors: on the main diagonal, there is 
commutativity of the second products and on the 
second diagonal there is commutativity of the first 
products. 
𝑈 = (
𝑢11 𝑢12
𝑢21 𝑢22
) , 𝑉 = (
𝑣11 𝑣12
𝑣21 𝑣22
) 
⟹   𝑈𝑉 = (
𝑢11𝑣11 + 𝑣21𝑢12 𝑣12𝑢11 + 𝑢12𝑣22
𝑣11𝑢21 + 𝑢22𝑣21 𝑢21𝑣12 + 𝑣22𝑢22
) 
In our article we will adopt the Hamiltonian product 
as an operation of multiplication of the 
quaternionique matrices. 
E. Schur complement and inversibility of 
quaternionique matrices 
Let ℛ be an arbitrary associative ring, a matrix 𝑀 ∈
ℛ𝑛×𝑛 is supposed to be invertible if ∃𝑁 ∈ ℛ𝑛×𝑛 
such that 𝑀𝑁 = 𝑁𝑀 = 𝐼𝑛 where 𝑁 is necessarily 
unique. 
The Schur complement method is a very powerful 
tool for calculating inverse of matrices in rings. Let 
𝑀 ∈ ℛ𝑛×𝑛 be a matrix per block satisfying: 
𝑀 = (
𝐴 𝐵
𝐶 𝐷
) such that 𝐴 ∈ ℛ𝑘×𝑘. 
Suppose that 𝐴 is invertible, we have: 
𝑀 = (
𝐼𝑘 0
𝐶𝐴−1 𝐼𝑛−𝑘
) (
𝐴 0
0 𝐴𝑠
) (
𝐼𝑘 𝐴
−1𝐵
0 𝐼𝑛−𝑘
) where 
 
 
𝐴𝑠 = 𝐷 − 𝐶𝐴
−1𝐵 is the Schur complement of 𝐴 
in 𝑀. 
The inversibility of 𝐴 ensures that the matrix 𝑀 is 
invertible if and only if 𝐴𝑠 is invertible. The inverse 
of 𝑀 is: 
 𝑀−1 = (
𝐼𝑘 −𝐴
−1𝐵
0 𝐼𝑛−𝑘
) (
𝐴−1 0
0 𝐴𝑠
−1) (
𝐼𝑘 0
−𝐶𝐴−1 𝐼𝑛−𝑘
) 
               = (
𝐴−1 + 𝐴−1𝐵𝐴𝑠
−1𝐶𝐴−1 −𝐴−1𝐵𝐴𝑠
−1
−𝐴𝑠
−1𝐶𝐴−1 𝐴𝑠
−1 ). 
For a quaternionique matrix 
𝑀 = (
𝑎 𝑏
𝑐 𝑑
) ∈ ℛ2×2 = 𝕄𝟐(ℍ(ℤ/𝒏ℤ)) where the 
quaternion 𝑎 is invertible as well as its Schur 
complement 𝑎𝑠 = 𝑑 − 𝑐𝑎
−1𝑏 we have 𝑀 is 
invertible and: 𝑀−1 = (
𝑎−1 + 𝑎−1𝑏𝑎𝑠
−1𝑐𝑎−1 −𝑎−1𝑏𝑎𝑠
−1
−𝑎𝑠
−1𝑐𝑎−1 𝑎𝑠
−1 ). 
Therefore, to randomly generate an invertible 
quaternionique matrix, it suffices to: 
 Choose randomly three quaternions 𝑎, 𝑏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐 
for which 𝑎 is invertible. 
 Select randomly the fourth quaternion 𝑑 such 
that the Schur complement 𝑎𝑠 = 𝑑 − 𝑐𝑎
−1𝑏 of 
𝑎 in 𝑀 is invertible. 
 
IV. A VERIFIABLE FHE SCHEME 
We place ourselves in a context where Bob wants to 
store confidential data in a very powerful but non-
confident cloud. Bob will later need to execute 
complex processing on his data, of which he does 
not have the necessary computing powers to 
perform it. At this level he thinks for, at first, the 
encryption of his sensitive data to avoid any 
fraudulent action. But the ordinary encryption, 
which he knows, does not allow the cloud to 
process his calculation requests without having 
decrypted the data stored beforehand, which 
impairs their confidentiality. Bob asks if there is a 
convenient and efficient type of encryption to 
process his data without revealing it to the cloud. 
The answer to Bob's question is favorable, in fact 
since 2009 there exist so-called fully homomorphic 
encryption, the principle of which is quite simple: 
doing computations on encrypted data without 
thinking of any previous decryption. 
As the cloud is unconfident, computations over 
encrypted data may be false or done incorrectly. 
Bob must have tools to verify the veracity of the 
demanded computations. For this purpose, the 
cloud must show Bob a proof, which can be 
verified by Bob on receipt, of the exactitude of the 
performed operations. This proof is an additional 
service offered by the used fully homomorphic 
scheme. 
In order to profitably benefit from the technological 
advance of the cloud computing and to outsource its 
heavy calculations comfortably, Bob needs a robust 
highly secure and verifiable fully homomorphic 
encryption scheme whose operations, addition and 
multiplication, are done in a judicious time, whose 
noise generated during a treatment is manageable 
and of which he has a proof of exactitude of the 
performed operations on encrypted data. 
To help Bob take full advantage of the powers of 
the cloud, we introduce a probabilistic symmetric 
and verifiable fully homomorphic encryption 
scheme without noise. The addition and 
multiplication operations generate no noise. We can 
describe our cryptosystem as follows: 
Key generation 
-Bob generates randomly two big prime numbers p 
and q. 
-Then, he calculates  𝑵 = p. q. 
-Bob generates randomly an invertible matrix 
𝐾 = (
𝑘1 𝑘2
𝑘3 𝑘4
) = (
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
𝑎13 𝑎14
𝑎23 𝑎24
𝑎31 𝑎32
𝑎41 𝑎42
𝑎33 𝑎34
𝑎43 𝑎44
) ∈ 𝕄𝟒(ℍ(ℤ 𝑵
𝟐ℤ⁄ )) 
such that 𝑘1 is an invertible matrix. 
- Bob calculates the inverse of 𝐾 and 𝑘1, Which 
will be denoted   𝐾−1 and 𝑘1
−1. 
-The secrete key is (𝑘1, 𝑘1
−1, 𝐾, 𝐾−1). 
Encryption 
Lets 𝜎 ∈ ℤ N2ℤ⁄  be a clear text. To encrypt 𝜎 Bob 
proceed as follows: 
- Bob transforms 𝜎 into a quaternion: 
𝑚 = 𝜎 + 𝛼𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽𝑁𝑗 + 𝛾𝑁𝑘 ∈ ℍ(ℤ 𝑵𝟐ℤ⁄ ) such that 
𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 ∈ ℤ 𝑵ℤ⁄ . 
-Bob generates a matrix: 𝑀 = (
𝑚 𝑟1
0 𝑟2
) ∈ 𝕄𝟐 (ℍ(ℤ 𝑵
𝟐ℤ⁄ )) 
such that 𝑟1 and  𝑟2 ∈  ℍ(ℤ 𝑵
𝟐ℤ⁄ ) are randomly 
generated. 
-Bob calculates 𝑀′ = 𝑘1𝑀𝑘1
−1. 
- Bob transforms 𝜎 into a quaternion: 
𝑚′ = 𝜎 + 𝛼′𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽′𝑁𝑗 + 𝛾′𝑁𝑘 ∈ ℍ(ℤ 𝑵𝟐ℤ⁄ ). 
-Bob generates a matrix 𝑀′′ = (𝑚′ 𝑟1′
0 0
) ∈ 𝕄𝟐 (ℍ(ℤ 𝑵
𝟐ℤ⁄ )) 
such that 𝑟1′ ∈  ℍ(ℤ 𝑵
𝟐ℤ⁄ ) 
-The ciphertext of 𝜎 is: 
 
 
𝐶 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝜎) = 𝐾 (𝑀′ 𝑅
0 𝑀′′
) 𝐾−1 ∈ 𝕄𝟒(ℍ(ℤ 𝑵
𝟐ℤ⁄ )) such 
that 𝑅 ∈ 𝕄𝟐(ℍ(ℤ 𝑵
𝟐ℤ⁄ )) is randomly generated. 
Decryption and verification 
Lets 𝐶 ∈ 𝕄𝟒(ℍ(ℤ 𝑵
𝟐ℤ⁄ )) be a ciphertext. To 
decrypt 𝐶, using his secrete key (𝑘1, 𝑘1
−1, 𝐾, 𝐾−1), 
Bob proceed as follows: 
-He calculates (𝑀′ 𝑅
0 𝑀′′
) = 𝐾−1𝐶𝐾. 
-He computes 𝑀 = 𝑘1
−1𝑀′𝑘1. 
- Then he takes the first inputs of the resulting 
matrices 𝑚 = (𝑀)1,1 and 𝑚′ = (𝑀′)1,1 
- Finally, he recovers his clear message by verifying 
if  𝜎 = 𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑁 = 𝑚′𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑁. If the verification is 
true, then the clear message returned is σ otherwise 
the ciphertext has been modified. 
Addition and multiplication: 
Let 𝜎1 and 𝜎2be two clear texts and 𝐶1 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝜎1) 
and  𝐶2 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝜎2) be their ciphertexts 
respectively. 
It is easy to verify that: 
(1) 𝐶𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 𝐶1 × 𝐶2𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁
2 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝜎1) ×
𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝜎2)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁
2 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝜎1 × 𝜎2). 
(2) 𝐶𝑎𝑑𝑑 = 𝐶1 + 𝐶2𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁
2 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝜎1) +
𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝜎2)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁
2 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝜎1 + 𝜎2).  
 
V. Security of the Scheme 
Ciphertext indistinguishability is an important 
security property of many encryption schemes. 
Intuitively, if a cryptosystem possesses the 
property of indistinguishability, then an 
adversary will be unable to distinguish pairs of 
ciphertexts based on the message they encrypt. 
It is easy to see that a fully homomorphic 
encryption scheme cannot be secure against 
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-
CCA2). 
The adversary: 
We are protecting ourselves from an adversary 
𝒜, who: 
 Is a probabilistic polynomial time 
Turing machine. 
 Has all the algorithms. 
 Has full access to communication 
media. 
Chosen Ciphertext Attack 
In this model, the attack assumes that the 
adversary 𝒜  has access to an encryption 
oracle and that the adversary can choose an 
arbitrary number of plaintexts to be encrypted 
and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts. In 
addition, the adversary 𝒜 gains access to a 
decryption oracle, which decrypts arbitrary 
ciphertexts at the adversary’s request, returning 
the plaintext. 
Startup 
1. The challenger generates a secret key 
𝑆𝑘 based on some security parameter 
𝑘 (e.g., a key size in bits) and retains 
it. 
2. The adversary 𝒜 may ask the 
encryption oracle for any number of 
encryptions, calls to the decryption 
oracle based on arbitrary ciphertexts, 
or other operations. 
3. Eventually, the adversary 𝒜 submits 
two distinct chosen plaintexts 𝑚0, 𝑚1 
to the challenger. 
The Challenge 
4. The challenger selects a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0,1} 
uniformly at random, and sends the 
“challenge” ciphertext 𝐶 =
𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑆𝑘, 𝑚𝑏) back to the adversary. 
The adversary is free to perform any 
number of additional computations or 
encryptions. 
a. In the non-adaptive case (IND-
CCA), the adversary may not 
make further calls to the 
decryption oracle before guessing. 
b. In the adaptive case (IND-CCA2), 
the adversary may make further 
calls to the decryption oracle, but 
may not submit the challenge 
ciphertext C. 
5. In the end it will guess the value of 𝑏. 
The Result 
 
 
 Again, the adversary 𝒜 wins the game 
if it guesses the bit 𝑏. 
 A cryptosystem is indistinguishable 
under chosen ciphertext attack if no 
adversary can win the above game 
with probability 𝑝 greater than 
1
2
+ 𝜀 
where is a negligible function in the 
security parameter 𝑘. 
 If 𝑝 >
1
2
 then the difference 𝑝 −
1
2
 is 
the advantage of the given adversary in 
distinguishing the ciphertext. 
In our situation, the adversary 𝒜 should 
distinguish an encryption of zero from an 
encryption of one after asking the encryption 
oracle of a number of encryptions and the 
decryption oracle to decrypt arbitrary 
ciphertexts. The adversary 𝒜 can do 
operations on the two given ciphertexts to 
distinguish zero from one, as he can do 
operations on the entire ciphertext matrices or 
just to use some entrees (the diagonal of 
ciphertexts matrices). In our case, even if the 
diagonal of 𝑀 determines completely the 
invertibility of  𝐶, an encryption of a cleartext 
𝜎 ∈ ℤ N2ℤ⁄  is always non invertible because of 
the choice of the last component of the matrix 
𝑀′′, which is null. Therefore, an adversary 
cannot then distinguish encryptions of units 
from encryptions of non-units. Consequently, 
the attack proposed on Li-Wang’s scheme [10] 
in [12] do not work for our case. Based on 
these assumptions, we believe that our fully 
homomorphic encryption scheme is 
indistinguishable under chosen ciphertext 
attacks (IND-CCA1). 
Concerning the security of the secret key: 
Given a random secret key of our encryption 
scheme: 𝐾 = (
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
𝑎13 𝑎14
𝑎23 𝑎24
𝑎31 𝑎32
𝑎41 𝑎42
𝑎33 𝑎34
𝑎43 𝑎44
) and 𝐾−1 =
(
𝑎11̅̅ ̅ 𝑎12̅̅ ̅
𝑎21̅̅ ̅ 𝑎22̅̅ ̅
𝑎13̅̅ ̅ 𝑎14̅̅ ̅
𝑎23̅̅ ̅ 𝑎24̅̅ ̅
𝑎31̅̅ ̅ 𝑎32̅̅ ̅
𝑎41̅̅ ̅ 𝑎42̅̅ ̅
𝑎33̅̅ ̅ 𝑎34̅̅ ̅
𝑎43̅̅ ̅ 𝑎44̅̅ ̅
). And cleartext 𝜎 ∈
ℤ N2ℤ⁄ . 
A ciphertext of 𝑚 = 𝜎 + 𝛼𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽𝑁𝑗 + 𝛾𝑁𝑘 ∈
ℍ(ℤ 𝑵𝟐ℤ⁄ ) such that 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 ∈ ℤ 𝑵ℤ⁄ , is determined 
by: 𝐶 = 𝐾 (
𝑀′ 𝑅
0 𝑀′′
) 𝐾−1 = (
𝑐11 𝑐12
𝑐21 𝑐22
𝑐13 𝑐14
𝑐23 𝑐24
𝑐31 𝑐32
𝑐41 𝑐42
𝑐33 𝑐34
𝑐43 𝑐44
) 
such that 𝑀 = (
𝑚 𝑟3 𝑟4
0 𝑟1 𝑟5
0 0 𝑟2
). 
Therefore, we obtain sixteen equations issued 
from matrix operations. 
According to the decryption algorithm, the 
plaintext 𝑚 can be obtained by the equation: 
(1) 𝑚 = (𝑎1,1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c1,1 + 𝑎1,2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c2,1 + 𝑎1,3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c3,1 +
𝑎1,4̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c4,1)𝑎1,1 + (𝑎1,1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c1,2 + 𝑎1,2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c2,2 +
𝑎1,3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c3,2 + 𝑎1,4̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c4,2)𝑎2,1 + (𝑎1,1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c1,3 +
𝑎1,2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c2,3 + 𝑎1,3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c3,3 + 𝑎1,4̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c4,3)𝑎3,1 +
(𝑎1,1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c1,4 + 𝑎1,2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c2,4 + 𝑎1,3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c3,4 +
𝑎1,4̅̅ ̅̅ ̅c4,4)𝑎4,1 
An adversary who possesses the ciphertext 𝐶  
and wants to find the cleartext m or the secret 
key from the above sixteen equations should, 
at least, extract the secret components 𝑎1,1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 
𝑎1,2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑎1,3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑎1,4̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 𝑎1,1, 𝑎2,1 ,𝑎3,1 and𝑎4,1 
according to the equation (1). Since our fully 
homomorphic encryption scheme is 
probabilistic, these sixteen equations are 
randomly independent even if the encrypted 
messages are the same one. Therefore finding 
the secret key is equivalent to a problem of 
solving an over-defined system of quadratic 
multivariate polynomial equations in a non-
commutative ring. 
 
VI. Comparison with other schemes 
Table 1: comparison of the performances of FHE schemes 
Algorithm Cleartext 
space 
Secret key 
size 
Public key 
size 
Ciphertext 
size 
Gentry[2] {0,1} 𝒏𝟕 𝒏𝟑 𝒏𝟏.𝟓 
Smart-Verc[3] {0,1} 𝑶(𝒏𝟑) 𝒏𝟑 𝑶(𝒏𝟏.𝟓) 
DGHV[4] {0,1} ?̃?(𝝀𝟏𝟎) ?̃?(𝝀𝟐) ?̃?(𝝀𝟓) 
CMNT[8] {0,1} ?̃?(𝝀𝟕) ?̃?(𝝀𝟐) ?̃?(𝝀𝟓) 
Batch 
DGHV[9] 
{0,1}𝑙 ?̃?(𝝀𝟕) 𝒍. ?̃?(𝝀𝟐) 𝒍. ?̃?(𝝀𝟓) 
LI-WANG[10] ℤ 𝑁ℤ⁄  𝑶(𝟑𝑵) 𝑵𝑨 𝑶(𝟑𝑵) 
Our scheme ℤ N2ℤ⁄  𝑶(𝟏𝟔N2) 𝑵𝑨 𝑶(𝟏𝟔N2) 
 
 
As it is shown in table 1, our cryptosystem presents 
good performances compared to other existing 
schemes. Its ciphertext and key sizes depend 
linearly to cleartext space dimension. The other 
schemes use a small cleartext space which 
influences the runtime of the algorithm. In our case 
we are using a large cleartext space which allows us 
to encrypt big messages and perform computations 
directly on ciphertexts. We can observe that the 
complexity of Li-Wang’s scheme is smaller than 
ours, but this scheme uses a smaller cleartext space 
and it is not a verifiable scheme. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES: 
In this paper, we presented a new verifiable fully 
homomorphic encryption scheme. It is symmetric, 
noise free and probabilistic cryptosystem, for which 
the ciphertext space is a non-commutative ring 
quaternionic based. The cleartext can be a large 
number 𝜎 ∈ ℤ N2ℤ⁄ . Our encryption scheme finds 
its effective applications in the domain of smart 
computations on encrypted data in cloud computing 
as it can be applied also to big data security. It is an 
efficient and practical scheme whose security is 
based on the problem of solving an over-defined 
system of quadratic multivariate polynomial 
equations in a non-commutative ring. In the next 
work we will implement this cryptosystem and 
proof its security. 
REFERENCES 
[1] R. Rivest, . L. Adleman and M. Dertouzos, «On data banks 
and privacy homomorphisms,» Foundations of Secure 
Computation, pp. 169-180, 1978. 
[2] C. Gentry, «A fully homomorphic encryption scheme.,» 
PhD thesis, Stanford University, 2009. 
http://crypto.stanford.edu/craig-thesis 
[3] N. Smart and F. Vercauteren, «Fully Homomorphic 
Encryption with Relatively Small Key and Ciphertext 
Sizes.,» Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/571, 
2009. http://eprint.iacr.org/571.pdf 
[4] M. van Dijk, C. Gentry, S. Halevi and V. Vaikuntanathan, 
«Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers,» 
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/616, 2009. 
http://eprint.iacr.org/..  
[5] G. Chunsheng., «Fully Homomorphic Encryption Based on 
Approximate Matrix GCD,» Aavailable at 
eprint.iacr.org/2011/645.pdf.  
[6] V. Vikuntanathan and Z. Brakerski, «Efficient Fully 
Homomorphic Encryption from (Standard) LWE,» 
Available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/344.pdf  
[7] A. EL-YAHYAOUI et M. EL KETTANI, «Fully 
homomorphic encryption: state of art and comparison,» 
Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/25106824/Fully_Homomorphic
_Enc ryption_State_of_Art_and_Comparison.  
[8] J. Coron, A. Mandal, D. Naccache, M. Tibouchi, “Fully 
Homomorphic Encryption over the Integers with Shorter 
Public Keys”. Available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/441 
[9] J. Coron T. Lepoint and M. Tibouchi. “Batch fully 
homomorphic encryption over the integers.” 2012. 
Available at eprint.iacr.org/2013/36  
[10] J. Li and L. Wang, “Noise-free Symmetric Fully 
Homomorphic Encryption based on noncommutative 
rings”, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/641.  
[11] M. Yagisawa “ Improved fully homomorphic encryption 
with composite number modulus” Cryptology ePrint 
Archive, Report 2016/50, 2016. http://eprint.iacr.org 
[12] G. Kristian et S. Martin , «Can there be efficient and 
natural FHE?,» https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/105.pdf 
